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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900289 
v. : 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of second degree 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 (Supp. 1990), aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1990), and 
threatening or using a dangerous weapon in a quarrel, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107 (Supp. 
1990), in the First Judicial District Court, in and for Box Elder 
County, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. a. and d. Does the record support defendant's 
allegations that the trial court belatedly appointed a private 
investigator and allowed the jury to sit in the jury room all day 
long while jury instructions were being prepared? Defendant must 
support his allegations with cites to the record. See, e.g., 
State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986). 
b. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motions for psychiatric testing and appointment of a 
psychiatrist? "[A]n error warrants reversal only if the 
substantial rights of a party are affected. . . . This occurs 
when a reasonable likelihood exists that absent the error, the 
result would have been more favorable to the defendant. . . . " 
State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989). 
c. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion to view the crimw scene?. Defendant 
does not support his argument by legal analysis or authority, and 
this Court may decline to rule on it. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
2. Is defendant entitled to a reversal of his 
conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct? Defendant 
did not preserve the issue for appeal. Traditionally, this Court 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. 
State v, Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1984). 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion 
for a continuance? "It is well-established that the granting of 
a continuance is discretionary with the trial judge. Absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion, the decision will not be reversed 
by this Court." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial? The "decision to grant or 
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deny a new trial is a matter of discretion with the trial court 
and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion." Id. 
5. Should this Court consider defendant's argument, 
made pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)? 
Appellate counsel need not raise every possible issue on appeal. 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). 
6. Does the doctrine of cumulative error apply in this 
case? The cumulative error doctrine does not apply when no 
substantial errors were committed at trial. State v. Rammel, 721 
P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertinent 
to the resolution of the issues presented on appeal may be found 
in the body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, was charged with 
second degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1990) and five counts of aggravated 
assault, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1990) 
(R. 4-7).l 
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second 
degree murder, one count of aggravated assault and one count of 
threatening or using a dangerous weapon in a quarrel (R. 338-
1
 Defendant was bound over to the district court on only two 
of the five aggravated assault charges (R. 4, 5). 
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343). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms in the Utah 
State Prison of five years to life for the murder, zero to five 
years for aggravated assault and six months with credit for time 
served for threatening or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel (R. 345). Defendant was also ordered to pay costs and 
restitution (.Id. ). 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial (R. 348-51). 
After hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 364). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 374). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A lengthy recitation of the facts of defendant's crimes 
is not necessary to the resolution of the issues raised on 
appeal. Defendant's convictions arose out of an incident in 
which he and three others killed Miguel Ramirez, and defendant 
assaulted Eddie Apodaca and threatened Sherman Galardo at a brine 
shrimp harvesting camp on the western shore of the Great Salt 
Lake in October, 1989. 
Additional facts pertinent to the issues raised on 
appeal are set forth in the argument portion of the brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The record indicates that, contrary to defendant's 
assertion, a private investigator worked on his behalf within two 
weeks of the crime. The trial court properly denied defendant's 
motions for psychiatric testing and appointment of a psychiatrist 
as having been untimely filed, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-
14-4 (1990). Defendant did not produce evidence supporting a 
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voluntary intoxication defense. Defendant did not support his 
assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to view the crime scene, but, even if 
supported by legal analysis, his argument must fail because the 
decision to permit the jury to view the crime scene is within the 
court's discretion. Defendant has not produced evidence 
supporting his allegation that the jury was allowed to sit in the 
jury room all day while jury instructions were being prepared. 
Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor acted 
improperly at trial. 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a 
continuance was proper, and defendant's argument that he did not 
have time to prepare for trial is not believable because defense 
counsel was appointed within a week of the crime, over two and 
one half months prior to trial. 
The trial court acted within its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial, and defendant's claim on 
appeal that "newly discovered" evidence existed was neither 
preserved below nor substantively supportable. 
This Court need not consider an argument made pursuant 
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because appellate 
counsel raised numerous issues on appeal and is not required to 
raise every possible appellate issue. Moreover, defendant does 
not contend that the appeal was "wholly frivolous," as required 
by Anders. The doctine of cumulative error does not apply in 
this case because no substantial errors were committed. 
-5-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
PRETRIAL MOTIONS, AND DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO 
SUPPORT HIS ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE 
BELATED APPOINTMENT OF A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWING THE JURY TO SIT 
ALL DAY IN THE JURY ROOM WHILE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS WERE BEING PREPARED. 
Introduction 
As his first allegation of error, defendant asserts 
that he was forced to be ineffective as counsel because of the 
denials of various motions, particularly the denial of motions 
for continuances of his trial (Br. of Appellant at 19). However, 
under his Point III, defendant more specifically argues that 
position and, therefore, the State will respond to that 
allegation in its Point III. 
Defendant also argues that the denial of various 
motions violated his right to a fair trial, due process of law 
and equal protection under both the sixth and fourteenth 
amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution. However, defendant only 
nominally argues due process, equal protection and sixth 
amendment considerations and does not offer a separate state 
constitutional analysis.2 Accordingly, the State will respond 
2
 Defendant did not raise a state constitutional issue 
below, and this Court traditionally has refused to consider such 
a claim for the first time on appeal. State v. Anderson, 789 
P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). 
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to defendant's allegations only in the manner presented in his 
specific arguments. 
A. Defendant had the use of a private 
investigator from the outset of the case. 
Defendant alleges that the trial court "initially 
refused to appoint, and then reluctantly and belatedly appointed 
a private investigator to assist Appellant's trial counsel in 
pretrial investigation and preparation," noting that the trial 
court "did not enter an Order appointing a private investigator 
for Appellant until January 17, 1990, more than two months after 
the initial request for a private investigator and less than six 
(6) days before the trial date of February 5/ 1990 
rsiclrdefendant's trial ran from January 22, 1990 through January 
26, 19901."(emphasis in appellant's brief) (Br. of Appellant at 
20, 21). Defendant particulary alleges that if an investigator 
had been appointed prior to the preliminary hearing he could have 
taken pictures of the crime scene which could have been used in 
examining the witnesses at that time (JEci. at 23). Finally, 
defendant states that "the belated appointment of a private 
investigator had a devastating effect on the ability of defense 
counsel to prepare, and to allow the defendant to prepare his 
self-defense argument" (Jjd. at 24). 
In presenting this argument, defendant has blatantly 
misrepresented the facts and manipulated the record to support 
his allegations of prejudice. Although defendant correctly 
states that the order appointing the private investigator was not 
entered until January 17, 1990, he neglects to apprise this Court 
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that Tim Francis, the private investigator in his employ who was 
ultimately formally appointed by the trial court, had been 
working actively on this case since at least November 7, 1989, 13 
days after the crime and six weeks before the preliminary 
hearing. At the trial Francis testified that he first visited 
the scene of the crime on November 7, 1989, took pictures at that 
time, sat through the preliminary hearing, heard the testimonies 
of Eddie Apodaca, Eric Tilley and Richard Anderson and visited 
and photographed the scene two other times before the trial, on 
January 6, 1990 and on January 20, 1990 (transcript of trial 
[herinafter "TA"] at 563, 566, 571, 581-83). Moreover, defendant 
may have used the photographs taken on November 7 at the 
preliminary hearing (see R. 125, list of defendant's exhibits at 
preliminary hearing, where D 1-3, submitted by defendant, were 
photographs of the scene). 
Other evidence in the record supports the fact that 
Francis was involved in the case far before January 17, 1990. In 
his motion for a continuance, dated January 10, 1990, defendant 
refers to "the private investigator appointed in this matter" 
(R.143, paragraphs 6 and 7). The State's response to that 
motion, of the same date, notes that "investigators were 
appointed weeks ago" (R. 148, paragraph 6). Finally, defense 
counsel himself, in his closing argument at trial, acknowledged 
that Francis had been out at the scene of the crime "two or three 
weeks" after the murder (TA. 777). 
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It appears that the formal order appointing Francis was 
a bookkeeping matter, probably entered to ensure payment of his 
fees. It is noteworthy that defendant never filed a written 
motion for the appointment of the investigator in the district 
court, as required by rule 12(a), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The record indicates that he filed a motion in the 
circuit court on November 2, 1989 and that that motion was denied 
on the following day (R. 18-20, 28). In denying the motion, the 
circuit court relied on Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 
447 P.2d 189 (1968), in which this Court interpreted the 
identical predecessor to the current statute governing the 
providing of investigatory aid to an indigent criminal defendant 
(R. 28). There, this Court stated: 
When counsel has once been appointed, he can 
petition the county to appoint an 
investigator; and in the case of a refusal to 
act, counsel can then bring a writ of 
mandamus in court, and the court can after 
hearing the matter determine if an 
investigator should be appointed and can 
order the commissioners of the county to make 
the appointment. 
22 Utah 2d at 11, 447 P.2d at 192. Although the record does not 
reflect the steps defendant took to secure the appointment of the 
investigator, it is possible that he heeded the circuit court's 
procedural directive and petitioned the county for the 
appointment. 
Regardless of defendant's actions to secure Francis's 
services subsequent to the circuit court ruling, the clear 
evidence in the record that he was working for defendant at least 
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by November 7 completely undermines his argument. His assertion 
to the contrary is meritless and should be ignored. 
B. The trial court properly denied 
defendant's motions for psychiatric testing 
and appointment of a psychiatrist. 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his 
sixth and fourteenth amendment rights by denying his motions to 
appoint psychiatric and other expert personnel, filed for the 
purpose of showing that defendant was unable to form the 
necessary intent to commit second degree murder due to his 
voluntary intoxication (Br. of Appellant at 24, 25). The trial 
court properly denied the motions for appointment of a 
psychiatrist and for psychological testing as untimely. 
Moreover, defendant has made no showing of prejudice because he 
did not produce evidence nor did he argue that he was so 
intoxicated that he could not form the requisite culpable mental 
state for the crime of second degree murder. State v. Dibello, 
780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989) ("Under rule 30 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, an error warrants reversal only if the 
substantial rights of a party are affected. . . . This occurs 
when a reasonable likelihood exists that absent the error, the 
result would have been more favorable to the defendant. . . . 
This 'reasonable likelihood' standard is met if our confidence in 
the outcome is undermined.") 
On January 16, 1990, 14 days after his arraignment, 
defendant filed a series of motions and notices, including a 
notice of intent to call psychiatric and other expert witnesses 
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(R. 184); a motion to allow psychological testing (R. 187-88); a 
notice of intent to claim lack of capacity to form intent (R. 
289-90); a motion and order for appointment of experts (R. 191-
92) and a motion to appoint psychiatric and expert personnel (R. 
201-02). A hearing was held on those motions on January 18/ 
1990. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motions 
regarding appointment of a psychiatrist and for psychological 
testing based on the fact that they were filed untimely pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-3 (1990) (transcript of hearing on 
pretrial motions [hereinafter "TM] at 44). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-4 (1990) reads, in. pertinent 
part, as follows: 
(1) When a defendant proposes to offer 
evidence that he is not guilty as a result of 
insanity or that he had diminished mental 
capacity or any other testimony of a mental 
health expert to establish mental state, he 
shall, at the time of arraignment or as soon 
afterward as practicable, but not fewer than 
30 days before trial, file and serve the 
prosecuting attorney with written notice of 
his intention to claim the defense. 
. . . 
(3) If the defendant fails to meet the 
requirements of Subsection (1), he may not 
introduce evidence tending to establish the 
defense unless the court for good cause shown 
otherwise orders. 
In denying defendant's motions, the trial court did not rely on 
the 30-day rule in subsection (1), ostensibly because the trial 
was scheduled for less than 30 days after the arraignment of 
January 2, 1990. Instead, it relied on the requirement that the 
defense be claimed "at the time of the arraignment or as soon 
afterward as practicable," noting that an extensive preliminary 
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hearing had been held (from December 19, 1989 through December 
22, 1989), after which defendant should have known whether 
diminished mental capacity would be a valid defense (T. 44). The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
motions. 
Defendant's own trial testimony utterly undermines any 
claim of incapacity due to voluntary intoxication and negates any 
issue of prejudice to defendant as a result of the trial court's 
ruling. When asked his state of intoxication on the evening of 
the murder, defendant stated, "I was pretty loaded, but I wasn't 
. . ., you know, slobber going down my face and stuff like Billy 
[Cayer], you know" (TA. 638). Although admitting that he was 
"pretty intoxicated," defendant, even after repeated questioning, 
could not specify how much he had drunk that night or that it was 
an excessive amount (TA. 662, 680, 685). Moreover, defendant was 
able to testify in great detail to his version of the events of 
the evening, including the precise chronology of the events that 
led up to the fatal beating (TA. 628-45) and specific statements 
made by the victim (TA. 647). He also gave a blow by blow 
description of the fight between the victim and himself (TA. 647-
55) and stated what he did after the fight, which included having 
another drink (TA. 655). No other evidence was offered to support 
a claim that defendant was so intoxicated that he was unable to 
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form the requisite culpable mental state for second degree 
murder.3 
Finally, defendant did not even raise the issue of his 
level of intoxication to the jury. His defense was that he acted 
in self-defense. In the absence of any evidence of debilitating 
intoxication, including defendant's own testimony, he could not 
make an intoxication claim. 
The trial court acted properly in denying defendant's 
motions, but, even if this Court finds that the trial court erred 
in denying the motion, defendant has failed to show how he was 
prejudiced by the ruling. 
C. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
view the crime scene. 
Defendant alleges, without providing legal analysis or 
authority, that the trial court abused its discretion in not 
permitting the jury to view the scene of the crime. On that 
basis alone this Court may refuse to consider the allegation. 
State v, Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the 
defendant fails to support [his] argument by any legal analysis 
or authority, we decline to rule on it.). 
3
 In order to utilize voluntary intoxication as a defense, a 
jury must determine that the degree of intoxication was so great 
as to negate the existence of the necessary mental state. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1990). See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 
(Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) ("[F]or. . . [the 
defendant] to have been successful [in employing a voluntary 
intoxication defense], he had to prove much more than he had been 
drinking. It was necessary to show that his mind had been 
affected to such an extent that he did not have the capacity to 
form the requisite . . . intent or purpose. . . . " ) . 
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Defendant's claim also lacks substantive merit. Rule 
17(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, vests the decision to 
permit the jury to view a crime scene in the trial court, as 
follows: 
When in the opinion of the court it is proper 
for the jury to view the place in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, or 
in which any other material fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place. 
. . . 
A trial court's decision will not be overturned unless the court 
"palpably" abuses its discretion. State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 
561, 155 P.2d 741, 764 (1945) ("The permitting of the view by the 
jury of articles or property involved in litigation . . . is a 
matter so largely in the discretion of the trial court that its 
decision will not be disturbed except for palpable abuse." 
(citation omitted)). Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar 
standard. State v. Mauro, 159 Ariz. 186, 766 P.2d 59 (1986); 
People v. Cisneros, 720 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 887 (1986); State v. Stoudamiref 30 Wash. App. 
41, 631 P.2d 1028, 1031 (1981). 
In the instant case, the trial court issued a 
memorandum decision denying defendant's motion to view the crime 
scene (R. 233-34). In so ruling the court considered, inter 
alia, the fact that the incident had happened three months 
before, in a very remote area of the state; that the incident was 
not necessarily related to terrain but to the conduct and 
behavior of individuals; that there was no assurance that the 
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conditions currently existing were the same as existed at the 
time of the incident; and that photographs, diagrams, maps and 
other exhibits were available as well as testimony of witnesses 
(Id.). The court also found that the trip to the scene would 
cause unnecessary disruption, inconvenience, delay, expense and 
potential risk to the jurors (R. 234). The court's ruling was 
reasonable, and it acted well within its broad discretion. 
On appeal, defendant does not demonstrate why the 
court's decision prejudiced him, but concludes, without record 
citation or support, that eyewitness identification was 
inadequate and testimony inconsistent. He has failed to show how 
the trial court abused its discretion, and his claim should be 
rejected. 
D. Defendant has produced no evidence in 
support of his allegation that the jury was 
allowed to sit in the jury room all day prior 
to its deliberations. 
Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in 
allowing the jury to sit all day in the jury room while waiting 
for the attorneys to prepare jury instructions. However, he has 
failed to support the allegation with cites to the record or with 
legal analysis or authority. On those bases alone, this Court 
could decline to consider the claim. State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 
(Utah 1986)("[D]efendant has failed to refer to pages in the 
record in support of his point on appeal. These deficiencies 
will normally require us to assume regularity in the proceedings 
below and correctness in the judgment appealed from." (citations 
omitted)); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1341. 
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Defendant's allegation is also factually incorrect. 
The record does not indicate when the jury began deliberations or 
how long they lasted. However, it does reflect that the jury was 
released during the morning, "to return to home or whatever,'• 
until 1:00 p.m. so that the jury instructions and other 
procedural matters could be resolved (TA. 716, 715). At that 
time the jurors were cautioned not to discuss the case (TA. 716). 
The only other record evidence concerning time indicates that the 
verdict was returned at 8:50 p.m. (TA. 802). As sparse as the 
record is concerning timing on the day of jury deliberations, it 
does reflect that the jury did not sit in the jury room all day, 
contrary to defendant's assertion. 
The trial court's admonition to the jurors not to 
discuss the case was proper, and it can be assumed that they 
complied. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Francis 
v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 325 n.9 (1985), it is an assumption 
crucial to our "constitutional system of trial by jury that 
jurors carefully follow their instructions." See also State v. 
Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 370, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974). 
Because defendant has not supported his argument with 
citation or legal analysis and because it is not supported by the 
record, it should be rejected. 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITILED TO A REVERSAL ON 
THE BASIS OF ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
Introduction 
Defendant alleges four acts of misconduct on the part 
of the prosecution that he claims warrant reversal of his 
convictions. The State will address each in turn and consolidate 
the second and fourth allegations because they both concern 
alleged improper comments in the prosecutor's closing argument. 
This Court has articulated the general test by which it measures 
alleged misconduct, as follows: 
We look to see if the actions or remarks of 
counsel call to the attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in 
considering in determining its verdict and, 
if so, under the circumstances of the 
particular casef whether "the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant." 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989)(quoting State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987)). See also State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989). 
A. Richard Anderson testified honestly and 
consistently concerning what he observed, and 
the exclusionary rule was not violated. 
Defendant first alleges that the prosecutor knowingly 
allowed Richard Anderson, an eyewitness to the beating of the 
victim, to testify falsely; that he permitted the witness to 
change his testimony; that the witness could not have seen the 
events he testified to and that a deputy violated the 
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exclusionary rule by contacting the witness and telling him of 
the contradiction in his testimony so that he could change it 
later (Br. of Appellant at 30, 31, 34). However, defendant has 
offered no evidence supporting any of the allegations. On that 
basis alone, his argument may be rejected. See State v. Olmos, 
712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 
1986) (references to matters outside the record are 
inappropriate, irrelevant and will not be considered). Moreover, 
defendant did not object to the testimony or bring the alleged 
improper conduct to the trial court's attention. Traditionally, 
this Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1984). 
A review of the record also will show that defendant's 
allegations are groundless. In charging that Anderson perjured 
himself, defendant cites to an alleged substantial inconsistency 
in his trial testimonies in that he first testified that he had 
not left the trailer and later, after another witness, Eric 
Tilley, changed his testimony by testifying that he had left the 
trailer. (Br. of Appellant at 34). That fact, were it true, 
would be insubstantial, but it is not true. Anderson's initial 
testimony was as follows: 
Q [Mr. Hunsaker] So, Mr. Anderson, what 
you're telling me is that this beating took 
place approximately 45 minutes to an hour and 
you stayed in your trailer the entire time, 
is that correct? 
A [Mr. Anderson] That's correct. 
(TA. 85). His later testimony was: 
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Q [Mr. Hunsaker] Okay. Both of you [Eric 
Tilley and Anderson] during this time frame 
stayed in the trailer, is that correct?4 
A [Mr. Anderson] That's correct. 
(TA. 545) 
. . . 
Q [Mr. Baron] Mr. Anderson, earlier there's 
some testimony from Eric Tilley that you may 
have gone out to search the truck or to see 
if there's some keys in the truck 
A [Mr. Anderson] That's correct. 
Q — Do you recall doing that? 
A That's correct. 
Q And do you recall when you did that? 
A I believe that it was right after the, you 
know, about a half hour or so after the fight 
was over. I went to check for the keys. 
(TA. 554-55). Anderson's testimony is wholly consistent. When 
first examined, he was asked if he stayed in the trailer during 
the beating, and he replied that he had. Later, when asked if he 
went outside to the truck to search for keys, he replied that he 
had, about a half hour after the fight was over. Defendant's 
claim that the testimony was perjured and false is incorrect. 
In conjunction with defendant's perjury allegation, he 
claims that Deputy Dale Ward, who attended the trial, improperly 
contacted Anderson concerning the alleged contradiction, in 
violation of the witness exclusionary rule. Again, defendant 
* At the time of this question defendant's attorney did not 
specify what the "time frame" was, but, assessing Anderson's 
responses throughout his testimony, it appears that he thought 
the attorney was referring to the time of the beating. 
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does not and cannot cite to any evidence in support of the 
allegation. It should be rejected. 
Defendant's other claim, that Anderson and Eddie 
Apodaca could not have seen what they testified about because 
they were sixty feet away and the door was closed (Br. of 
Appellant at 31), is without citation to the record and so vague 
that it is not possible to address in any substantial manner. 
However, the record does reflect that Anderson testified that 
part of the beating took place right outside of his trailer, 
about five feet from the door, and that he observed the beating 
from that distance (TA. 65, 98). He also testified that he 
opened the door of his trailer and that it remained open during 
the entire beating (TA. 64, 98). 
Defendant has offered no support for his initial 
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, and his claim must be 
rejected. 
B. As to his second allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct, defendant failed to 
preserve the issue at the trial court, has 
offered no evidence concerning the allegation 
and has made no specific argument concerning 
his allegation. 
As to his second allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct, defendant states that the prosecutor, in his closing 
argument, "presented more than just theory, he presented evidence 
as to how the Prosecutor's theory of the fabrication of self-
defense came about and that the story was not true or rehearsed 
(citations to transcript omitted). Even that evidence was 
destroyed . . . or placed (citations to transcript omitted)" (Br. 
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of Appellant at 36). He further charges, as his fourth allegation 
of prosecutorial misconduct, that "the prosecution committed 
plain error in vouching for the credibility of Richard Anderson 
[an eyewitness] (citations to transcript omitted). . . and 
otherwise interjecting his personal opinions on such matters 
regarding Richard Anderson having no reason to lie (citations to 
transcript omitted)" (B. of Appellant at 38). In so alleging, 
defendant cites to several transcript pages but neither specifies 
what the prosecutor said nor argues why it constituted 
misconduct. 
Moreover, defendant made no objections at the trial to 
any of the prosecutor's comments during his closing argument. 
This Court has long held that a timely objection must be 
interposed when alleged improper statements are made by a 
prosecutor. In State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978), this 
Court said: 
If counsel desires to object and preserve his 
record as to such an error during argument, 
he must call it to the attention of the trial 
court so that if he thinks that it is 
necessary and appropriate to do so, he will 
have an opportunity to rectify any error or 
impropriety therein and thus obviate the 
necessity of an entire new trial. 
Id. at 555. See also State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 
1982)(where, even when a constitutional defect was alleged, this 
Court refused to reach the issue because defendant failed to 
object to a prosecutor's statements during closing argument). 
More recently, this Court reiterated this requirement in State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), stating: 
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[I]t is a rule that if improper statements 
are made by counsel during a trial, it is the 
duty of opposing counsel to register a 
contemporaneous objection thereto so that the 
court may make a correction by proper 
instruction and, if the offense is 
sufficiently prejudicial, declare a mistrial. 
Id. at 561. Because defendant made no timely objection to the 
prosecutor's comments, this Court should decline to consider the 
argument. 
If this Court chooses to substantively address 
defendant's claim, it will see that the prosecutor did not 
improperly comment. This Court has consistently stated that 
counsel has a great deal of latitude in discussing the evidence 
and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence. In State v. 
Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975), this Court stated: 
It is our opinion that it is not only the 
prerogative, but the duty of either counsel, 
to analyze all aspects of the evidence; and 
this should include any pertinent statements 
or deductions reasonably to be drawn 
therefrom as to what the evidence is or is 
not, and what it does or does not show. 
Id. at 951. See also State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 560. 
Although defendant fails to develop his arguments 
beyond his initial allegations of error, a review of the pages 
cited by defendant in his brief reveals that the prosecutor was 
acting well within the allowable latitude in his closing 
argument. Each page cited reveals only proper comments on the 
evidence presented and the inferences that could be drawn from 
that evidence and includes no improper introduction of new 
evidence, as implied by defendant. The prosecutor did not vouch 
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for the witness and at no time interjected his personal opinions. 
Even if comments concerning the prosecution witnesses having no 
reason to lie could be construed as improper, they were "invited" 
by the defense attorney's repeated attacks on the witnesses' 
credibility during his closing argument (TA. 768-70, 775, 778-
79). See Id. at 560-61. 
Defendant has both failed to properly preserve and to 
substantively argue his allegations, and his claims should be 
rejected. 
C. Defendant has not alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
As to defendant's third allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct, he merely states that "there should have been no 
conviction on the charge of aggravated assault because the 
sharpening stone was not produced so as to give the jury the 
opportunity to determine if the weapon was in fact a deadly [sic] 
weapon as stated in the information" (Br. of Appellant at 37).5 
Defendant does not state why such an allegation constitutes 
prosecutorial misconduct, and it is not for the State to 
speculate what his argument may be. Moreover, the allegation 
lacks cites to the record and legal analysis and should not be 
considered. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. 
Defendant has failed throughout to offer any evidence 
supporting his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and has 
5
 Although Counts II and III of the original information 
alleged use of a "deadly weapon," they were changed to "dangerous 
weapon" to conform with the current statutory language (R. 5). 
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not properly preserved them for appellate review. Moreover, in 
none of his allegations has defendant shown that the prosecutor's 
actions or remarks called to the attention of the jury matters 
which it would not be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict or that any error was so substantial that a reasonable 
likelihood exists that, in their absence, there would have been a 
more favorable result for the defendant. He has thus failed to 
fulfill either prong of the test for assessing prosecutorial 
misconduct. See State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d at 287. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A CONTINUANCE. 
Defendant alleges that the trial court committed 
reversible error in denying his motion for a continuance and that 
by doing so forced defense counsel to be ineffective at trial. 
This Court has held that M[i]t is well-established that the 
granting of a continuance is discretionary wi.th the trial judge. 
Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the decision will not be 
reversed by this Court." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 
(Utah 1985). See also State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
1982). 
Although defendant alleges numerous grounds for the 
continuance and handicaps resulting from its denial, the crux of 
his argument is that he did not have sufficient time to prepare a 
proper defense. A brief chronological review of the case will 
demonstrate otherwise. On October 25, 1989, the victim was 
beaten, and he died early the following morning, October 26, 
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1989. Although the record is not clear concerning the precise 
date that defense counsel was appointed, it is certain that he 
was appointed at least by October 31, 1989, when he attended 
defendant's initial arraignment in the first circuit court (R, 8, 
10, 11). That date was five days after the victim's death and 
more that two and one-half months before the trial. Defendant's 
private investigator visited the crime scene 13 days after the 
murder and continued to actively assist in the defense up to and 
through the trial (TA. 563, 566, 571, 581-83). Defendant filed a 
motion for a continuance on January 10, 1990, the same day the 
trial court scheduled the trial for January 22-26, 1990 (R. 137, 
142-44). 
On January 11, 1990, the trial court issued a 
memorandum decision denying defendant's motion for a continuance 
(R. 150-51). It based its ruling on four grounds: that the 
charges had been filed in October, 1989 and the county attorney 
files had been open to defendant since that time; that an 
extensive four day preliminary hearing had been held at which all 
parties were able to thoroughly cross-examine all of the state's 
witnesses; that, due to the fact that there were four defendants, 
four trials were required with duplicative witnesses and 
testimony, which witnesses were transients, whose presence at the 
trials was questionable and required prompt trial settings; and 
that all the defendants were in custody and unable to make bail 
(R. 150). 
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The trial court's concern about the court's ability to 
retain witnesses was well-founded. Arrest warrants already had 
been issued for two of the four eyewitnesses to the beating, to 
assure their presence as material witnesses (R. 65, 134). One of 
those witnesses, Sherman G. Galardo, was never found, and Eric 
Tilley had left the state, thereby violating a condition of his 
not being incarcerated as a material witness, after testifying at 
the preliminary hearing. He was found prior to trial in Reno, 
Nevada (R. 135-36). The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying defendant's motion for a continuance. 
Defendant also has failed to prove that the trial 
court's decision rendered him ineffective as counsel. Denial of 
a continuance may result in the violation of a defendant's sixth 
amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 
937, 941-42 (5th Cir. 1967) (where trial court's denial of motion 
for continuance was found to have violated the defendant's right 
to counsel where defense counsel, through no fault of his own, 
was given copy of a written psychiatric report the morning of 
trial when it had been available three days before, and counsel 
was thereby rendered unable to prepare a proper defense); see 
also Heffernan v. Lockhart, 834 F.2d 1431 (8th Cir. 1987). 
However, defendant bears a heavy burden asserting any 
ineffectiveness claim. 
Interpreting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), this Court has stated: 
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant has the 
burden to demonstrate that counsel's representation 
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falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. . 
. . Defendant must prove that specific, identified acts 
or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. 
• • • 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be prejudicial to 
defendant. It is not enough to claim that the alleged 
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome or 
could have had a prejudicial effect on the fact 
finders. To be found sufficiently prejudicial, 
defendant must affirmatively show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that, but for counsel's error, the 
result would have been different. We have defined 
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient to 
undermine the confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict. 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). See also State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 893 (Utah 1989) . 
In the instant case, appellate counsel, who was also 
trial counsel, offers the somewhat novel argument that he was 
ineffective at trial due to the actions of the trial judge. In 
support of his claim, counsel states that he failed to 
adequately cross-examine the witnesses; to object to the jury 
panel or insure that minorities were represented; to determine 
whether separate or joint trials with the other defendants were 
appropriate; to investigate alcohol/intent claims by a 
psychiatrist; and to adequately prepare for the self-defense 
argument (Br. of Appellant at 43). Although he identifies 
alleged specific acts, defendant has offered no proof that the 
allegations are supported by the record or that they "fall 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. In fact, defense counsel 
extensively cross-examined witnesses at trial and presented the 
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only possible evidence supporting a self-defense claim, 
defendant's own testimony. The record is silent concerning jury 
impanelling. It does suggest, however, that an adequate 
determination of separate or joint trials was entered by counsel 
(T. 80-82). Although defense counsel sought to introduce an 
intoxication defense, the trial court properly denied his motions 
on that matter, and no evidence existed supporting that defense 
(see Point 1(b), supra). 
Moreover, defendant has not addressed the prejudice 
prong of the ineffectiveness test. He has shown neither that his 
actions fell outside the boundaries of effective assistance nor 
that the actions or omissions, if supported by evidence, were 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
jury's verdict. Accordingly, his claim must fail. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on March 2, 
1990, alleging 14 errors on the part of the trial court (R. 348-
51). That motion was accompanied by an affidavit, executed by 
defendant himself, that alleged numerous errors on the part of 
the trail court and defendant's trial attorney (R. 352-56). On 
March 23, 1990, a hearing was held on defendant's motion, at the 
close of which the trial court gave defendant ten days to file a 
supplemental brief on the issues (hearing on motion for new trial 
[hereinafter "TB"] at 15). Defendant did not submit a 
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supplemental brief, and the trial court denied the motion on 
April 23, 1990, by memorandum decision (R. 364). In so ruling 
the court stated that defendant had shown no good cause for a new 
trial because the issues raised already had been raised during 
and prior to trial (Ijd.). 
On appeal defendant alleges that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying his motion, claiming only that newly 
discovered evidence, formerly unavailable, now existed that would 
exculpate him (Br. of Appellant at 43). This Court has held that 
the "decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 
222 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 
1983)). Defendant bases his claim on the assertion that he 
sought to have his three codefendants, Don Brown, William Cummins 
and Billy Cayer, testify but that each of them refused to 
testify, invoking their fifth amendment rights against self-
incrimination (Br. of Appellant at 45). Although defendant never 
actually called the other defendants to testify, the court and 
parties appear to have stipulated to the fact that, had they been 
called, they would have exercised their fifth amendment rights 
(TA. 706-11).6 
6
 At the hearing on defendant's pretrial motions, held on 
January 18, 1990, the court and counsel addressed the issue of 
whether defendant intended to call the other three defendants as 
witnesses. The prosecution requested that, if they were called, 
they should be examined outside of the presence of the jury to 
determine whether they would invoke their fifth amendment rights 
(continued...) 
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In his motion for a new trial defendant alleged, "at 
trial, counsel for the Defendant attempted to call as witnesses 
the three co-defendants in this matter, but the Court refused to 
have them called as witnesses in this matter" (R. 349, paragraph 
6). The allegation misstates the facts. The trial court did not 
refuse to allow the other defendants to be called as witnesses. 
It would not allow defendant to call them solely for the purpose 
of having them invoke their fifth amendment rights in the 
presence of the jury. That decision was a proper exercise of the 
court's discretion. See State v. Travis, 541 P.2d 797, 798-99 
(Utah 1975) . 
In his motion for a new trial, defendant did not allege 
that the other defendants' testimonies constituted "newly 
discovered" evidence. He thereby waived his right to raise that 
issue for the first time on appeal. State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 
252, 254 (Utah 1983). On that basis alone, this Court should 
decline to consider defendant's argument. 
6(...continued) 
because of the highly prejudicial inferences that could be drawn 
from those invocations (T. 77-79). The court granted the 
prosecutor's request, specifically allowing defendant to call the 
codefendants outside of the presence of the jury (T. 79). At 
trial, after both sides had rested, defendant reintroduced the 
issue, moving the court to permit the other defendants to be 
called so that they could invoke their fifth amendment rights in 
the presence of the jury. The prosecution again objected, citing 
prejudice, and the court again ruled in favor of the State. In 
so ruling, the court accepted the proffer that the other 
defendants would invoke the fifth amendment, thereby making their 
presence in the court unnecessary (TA. 706-11). 
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However, if this Court chooses to address defendant's 
assertion substantively, his argument also must fail. As this 
Court stated in State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985): 
"New evidence" is not evidence which was 
available to defendant but not obtained by 
him prior to the time of trial. State v. 
Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77, 513 P.2d 438 (1973). 
Nor is it evidence that he knew about or 
could have discovered prior to trial. 
Other jurisdictions have specifically rejected attempts to 
characterize subsequent codefendant testimony as "new evidence" 
to justify the granting of a motion for a new trial. See United 
States v. Diqqs, 649 F.2d 731, 740 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 
U.S. 970 (1971) ("When a defendant who has chosen not to testify 
subsequently comes forward to offer testimony exculpating a 
codefendant, the evidence is not "newly discovered."); Garroutte 
v. State, 683 P.2d 262 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); People v. 
Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 560 n.12 (Colo. 1981). 
However, defendant does not assert, and has not offered 
proof, that the other defendants were willing to testify on 
defendant's behalf subsequent to their trials. Instead, he would 
rely on testimonies in transcripts of the subsequent trials, 
which he claims were exculpatory because they did not contradict 
defendant (Br. of Appellant at 45). Such an assertion is highly 
speculative and unsupported by any evidence. Even if supported 
by evidence, the argument must fail because such evidence could 
not be considered "newly discovered" for the same reasons noted 
above. Because the other defendants' testimonies, even if 
offered subsequent to trial, do not constutute "newly discovered" 
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evidence, his claim must be rejected. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT, MADE PURSUANT TO ANDERS 
V, CALIFORNIA, BECAUSE COUNSEL IS NOT URGING 
THIS COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT'S 
APPEAL IS "WHOLLY FRIVOLOUS." 
Defense counsel, purportedly relying on the rules 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), states five reasons, without 
supporting analysis, why defendant believes he was .denied a fair 
trial on account of his race. In Anders the Court sought to 
clarify the "extent of the duty of a court-appointed appellate 
counsel to prosecute a first appeal from a criminal conviction, 
after the attorney has consciously determined that there is no 
merit to the indigent's appeal." .Id., at 739. The Court outlined 
certain steps that counsel must take to allow the appellate court 
to determine whether the appeal was "wholly frivolous." jEd.. at 
744. This Court has adopted the United States Supreme Court's 
mandates as "as an expression of the requirements of due process 
of law under Article I, § 7 of our Constitutition." State v. 
Clayton, 639 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1981). See also Dunn v. Cook, 
131 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1990). 
In the instant case, defense counsel has not concluded 
that defendent's appeal is without merit. He has vigorously 
advocated on defendant's behalf, having raised a substantial 
-32-
number of issues on appeal. Apparently, he has concluded that 
the five allegations concerning racial bias are without merit. 
Appellate counsel need not raise every possible issue on appeal. 
In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the United States 
Supreme Court emphasized the "importance of having the appellate 
advocate examine the record with the view to selecting the most 
promising issues for review," stating that "a brief that raises 
every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments. . 
. ." Id. at 753. See also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 
(1986) (the "process of 'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal 
and focusing on' those most likely to prevail. . . is the 
hallmark of effective appellate advocacy." (quoting Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751-52)). Consequently, counsel was not 
required to present an Anders-type argument, and his attempt to 
do so should not be considered by the Court in this appeal.7 
POINT VI 
THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THIS MATTER BECAUSE THE CLAIMS 
RAISED BY DEFENDANT EITHER WERE NOT ERROR OR 
WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Defendant finally alleges that the cumulative impact of 
each "substantial" error prejudiced defendant's right to a fair 
trial and thereby constituted reversible error. As argued above, 
the errors claimed by defendant either were not error or were not 
substantial. The cumulative error doctrine does not apply when 
7
 Defense counsel also did not fulfill the procedural 
requirements of Anders and Clayton in presenting his argument, so 
this Court could not, on the basis of his brief, enter into the 
proper analysis to determine the frivolity of the appeal. 
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no substantial errors were committed. State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). Therefore, defendant's claim should be 
rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convictions should be affirmed. 
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